Inequality and financial crises

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Joint research with Salvatore Morelli
Plan of talk

Introduction

1. Inequality and crises: different views

2. Systemic banking crises 1911-2010


4. Evidence from 25 countries over 100 years

5. Interpretation: co-incident or causal?

Conclusions
How do crises affect inequality?


“The share of years ... that a country was exposed to a banking crisis has a substantive negative impact on top income shares” [5 year crisis reduces share of top 1 per cent by 1 percentage point]” (Roine, Vlachos and Waldenström, *Journal of Public Economics*, 2009).
How do crises affect inequality?

**INCREASE INEQUALITY**: “After nearly a decade of either declining or stable trend since the mid 1980s, the family income inequality in Korea sharply increased in the course of the financial crisis [of 1997], and remained high even after the economy recovered from the recession” (Lee, 2002).

“The current economic crisis has shown that it is the poor and vulnerable groups in society who are disproportionately affected by such shocks” (OECD, January 2011).

“Generally we find that financial crises worsen income inequality” (Bordo and Meissner, 2012).
Which inequality?

- Rising poverty rate?
- Falling top income shares?

The income “parade” of people → Income

Poverty line

“Middle class”

Gini coefficient
Does inequality increase the risk of financial crises?

**NO**: The indexes to three authoritative accounts of financial crises, by Kindleberger and Aliber (2005), Krugman (2009) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), contain neither “inequality” nor “income distribution”.

The US Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, set up in 2009 to investigate “the most significant financial crisis since the Great Depression”, was charged with examining 22 specific areas. None of these refer to inequality.
Does inequality increase the risk of financial crises?

**YES:** According to Stiglitz, in the face of stagnating real incomes, households in the lower part of the distribution in the US borrowed to maintain a rising standard of living. This borrowing later proved unsustainable, leading to default and pressure on over-extended financial institutions.

According to Rajan, “growing income inequality in the United States stemming from unequal access to quality education led to political pressure for more housing credit. This pressure created a serious fault line that distorted lending in the financial sector.”
Again which inequality?

Focus on lower part of the distribution

Poverty line

“Middle class”

Gini coefficient

Top income shares

The income “parade” of people → Income
Consider *systemic* banking crises (not limited to a few banks).

The study of crises requires long run data: “a data set that covers only twenty-five years simply cannot give one an adequate perspective” (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009).

It requires cross-country data: “to use history to gauge the probability and size distribution of macroeconomic disasters, it is hopeless to rely on the experience of a single country” (Barro, 2009, page 246).
We have relied on three major sources to identify systemic banking crises:

Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel and Martinez-Peria, 2001;

Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008, 2009 and Reinhart, 2010;


They do not cover all the same countries or the same time periods, and they do not always agree.

We have applied a majoritarian criterion. Where there are only two entries (one data-base does not cover the country or period), and they disagree, we have in general included the crisis.
Systemic banking crises

72 banking crises 1911-2010
• To explore the impact of a crisis, we need to be able to monitor change year by year: we need annual series;
• For the present crisis, we lack up-to-date distributional data for many countries;
• For past years, we cannot simply download annual series on inequality covering a range of countries;
• Data have to be pieced together from a variety of national sources; data for earlier parts of the century are hard (or impossible) to find;
• Priority given to time series consistency over cross-country comparability.
3. Case studies of US and Nordic countries

**Great Crash**

**Savings and Loan**

Inequality in the United States 1911-2010

- Gini coefficient, gross income of income recipients, series 1
- Gini coefficient, gross family income, series 2
- Gini coefficient, equivalised household gross income
- Share of top 0.1 per cent in gross income (%)
- Share of top 1 per cent in gross income (%)
- Per cent living below official poverty line
- Share of top 1 per cent (estate data: individuals) (%)
- Share of top 1 per cent (survey data: households) (%)
Figure NO1: Financial crises and inequality in Norway 1911-2010

The vertical line indicates the start of the recent banking crisis.
Figure FIN1 Financial crisis and inequality in Finland 1911-2010

Vertical line indicates start of banking crisis.
Index: Gini coefficient in 1991 as 100
Classification of 72 banking crises

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5. Interpretation: co-incident or causal?

1. Banking model, with competitive consumption:
   Increased demand for consumer borrowing to finance desired consumption to keep up with those whose earnings are rising faster; banks respond by taking on more risk. Change in inequality (top, overall and bottom) is causal.

2. Banking model, with introduction of securitization:
   Change in banking practices with introduction of securitization, taking on greater risk if greater inequality. Level of inequality (overall and bottom) is jointly causal.

3. Banking model, with shift in remuneration practices:
   Remuneration becomes tied more closely to sales, so that banks behave more like sales maximisers than maximisers of shareholder value, increasing the exposure to risk. Observe increased top inequality and increased risk of crisis. Co-incident, not causal.
4. Financial sector model, with bubbles: Asset bubble draws skilled workers into financial sector, causing wage dispersion to rise. Change in inequality (top) is co-incident, not causal.

5. Political economy model of monetary policy: In response to rise in inequality, deregulation of banking for distributional reasons. Change in inequality (overall and bottom) is causal.

6. Political economy model of deregulation: Increased inequality at the top leads to lobbying for deregulation. Change in inequality (top) is causal.

7. Government decides to reduce size of welfare state. Households respond by saving more in private pensions, driving up equity prices, and by “buy-to-let” purchases of housing, driving up house prices. Change in inequality (bottom) is co-incident, not causal.
Conclusions

• Economic inequality has many dimensions; here focused on income, but some of the most important impacts of financial crises may be those not measured, such as inequality of opportunity;

• Heterogeneity is important; different parts of the distribution may change differently and different parts are relevant to different explanations;

• The role of inequality in the origins of crises and the distributional impact of banking crises may differ over time: “this time it may be different”;

• In the US there was a substantial rise in inequality leading up to the 1929 and S+L crises, but this was not the case with the present crisis; on the other hand, in terms of levels of inequality, 2007 may be more like 1929 than the 1980s;
Conclusions

• Outside the US, the history of crises in different countries round the world does not suggest that either rising or high levels of inequality have been adduced as significant causal factors; there is a range of possible mechanisms, but it is not evident that there is a smoking gun;

• Cannot write off high inequality as temporary feature of bubble; in the US the only sustained period of inequality-reduction was in the early 1940s; quite a number of European (and Asian) countries have seen inequality and poverty rise after a banking crisis;

• Much unfinished business.