

Discussion of
Ampudia, Ehrmann, Strasser

The effect of monetary policy on inflation heterogeneity along the income distribution

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Own views, not necessarily shared by the Bank of Italy or the Eurosystem.

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Observable gauge of π_t :

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Comparing household specific HICPs:

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→ “Inflation” exits the picture.

1. Look directly at δ_{jt} .

Estimate $\text{IRF}(p_j; \epsilon)$ or more structural approach (e.g. Reis&Watson, 2010) to single out π_t and δ_{jt} 's and average item-specific components using budget shares at given date or average over time

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2. Place households of member countries in EA income distribution (HFCS) and look more closely at country heterogeneity in price developments when documenting EA responses

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3. Drop “differential inflation”. Potentially confusing, especially if from a CB, as it suggests multiple benchmarks to assess CB performance.

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Thank you.