# **Inequality hysteresis**

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This presentation reflects the views of its authors, not necessarily those of the Bank for International Settlements

### **Overview**

- Inequality has been on a rising trend since the mid-1980s
- Most see the rise as a result of important slow moving factors (eg technological progress and globalisation)
  - Policies to address the problem have thus tended to be of long-term structural nature (eg education, training programmes to upgrade skills, infrastructure, trade openness,...)
- Yet cyclical factors' contribution to rise in inequality has been overlooked
- We show that
  - 1. Inequality rises in downturns and fails to subside during the recovery
  - 2. Inequality makes recessions deeper
  - 3. Inequality dampens the stabilisation effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policy

# Inequality has been on a rising trend over the past decades...



- The top 10% earners (ie high skill labour force) are the clear winners
  - Technological change & globalisation have increased demand for high skill tasks
  - When supply of skilled labour fails to keep pace, skill premium rises (Tinbergen's race)

# ...but cyclical factors also matter! As shown (again) by the Covid-19 recessions:

EU: risk of job loss by income during the pandemic % 12

FR

SE

Middle



ΡL

US: employment by income



Likelihood of job loss more than 3 times larger for low income workers

DK

Employment recovered quickly only for the high-skilled

ΒE

NL

Low

ES

IE

IT

Income level: 🔥 High

FI

AT

# This pattern is systematic after recessions

Change in top 10% income share

Change in bottom 50% income share

Change in ratio of top 10% to bottom 50% income shares



<sup>1</sup> The graph report the impulse response based on a panel regression of income shares (or their ratio) on dummies that identify a recession, ie, a reduction in the level of GDP from the year before. Panel of 70 countries over 1983-2020, with 182 recessions identified among 1700 country-year observations.

# **Inequality hysteresis**

We label the distributional scars that recessions leave behind **inequality hysteresis** 

- Recessions leave persistent scars on inequality measures
- Hence, avoiding and mitigating recessions is crucial
- Stabilisation policies are key to reducing depth of scars
  - That also preserves their effectiveness



# Inequality and recessions

# Inequality deepens recessions

- Our key finding:
  - Higher income inequality means steeper falls in consumption during recessions
  - We find economically significant effect at the international level and across US states
  - Results due to variation across, but also within countries
- Empirical test:

$$\Delta_h c_{i,t} = \rho^h \Delta c_{i,t-1} + \alpha^h \operatorname{rec}_{i,t} + \gamma^h I_{i,t-1} + \beta^h \operatorname{rec}_{i,t} \times I_{i,t-1} + \lambda_i^h + \epsilon_{i,t+h-1}$$

Fixed effect panel data model of 84 countries with population>1m, GDP pc>\$ 3000 (in 2010 v)

# The cost of income inequality: steeper declines in private consumption

Recessions in more unequal countries lead to steeper declines in consumption

More unequal US states had steeper declines in consumption during the GFC



- recessions are significantly deeper in more unequal countries. Effect is economically significant (10<sup>th</sup> to 90<sup>th</sup> percentile, 3 p.p. negative effect on consumption growth)
- more unequal US states had deeper recessions post-GFC (inequality explains 25% of variation)



# Inequality and the transmission of monetary policy

# Why would it matter?

- In standard models, monetary policy transmits through intertemporal substitution
  - In reality, households have uncertain income and can only partially insure
- Under some assumptions, this seems not to matter (Krusell and Smith 1998)
  - Counter-cyclical income risk changes the picture (Werning 2015)
- Models with heterogeneous agents (Kaplan et al 2018)
  - Consumption inequality arises because of incomplete markets
  - Agents with little liquid wealth less sensitive to interest rates
- We present empirical evidence consistent with these models:
  - High inequality is associated with weaker MP transmission

# Cross-country evidence

Data for AU, CA, CH, EU, GB, JP, SE and US (1999Q1 to 2019Q4)

Two-step procedure:

- Identification of monetary policy shocks:
  - Three-equation panel VAR, with data at quarterly frequency
  - [GDP (log diff) CPI (log diff) policy rate]
- Estimation of effects of monetary shocks on consumption growth through a local projection regression:

$$\Delta_h c_{i,t+h-1} = \rho^h \Delta c_{i,t-1} + \alpha^h m_{i,t} + \beta^h m_{i,t} \times I_{i,t-1} + \gamma^h I_{i,t-1} + \lambda_i^h + \epsilon_{i,t+h-1},$$

*I<sub>i,t</sub>* is the share of income accruing to the top 10% of earners

# **Inequality dampens the effects of monetary stimulus** Panel reaction function, converted to annual frequency



 Cumulative consumption growth following a monetary stimulus is weaker in high-inequality countries

# **US-specific evidence**

- State-level data on inequality and income (1969 to 2008)
  - From 1990 also data on unemployment and social spending
- Romer and Romer (2004) monetary policy shocks
- Controls at the national level: unemployment, inflation, SP500 returns, change in the BAtreasury 10-year spread
- Estimation of effects of monetary shocks on income growth through a local projection regression:

$$\Delta_h y_{s,t+h-1} = \lambda_s^h + \rho^h \Delta y_{s,t-1} + \alpha^h m_t + \beta^h m_t \times I_{s,t-1} + \gamma^h I_{s,t-1} + \delta^h X_t + \epsilon_{s,t+h-1},$$

#### The effect is also visible on personal income across US states



# Conclusion

- Inequality hysteresis: recessions lead to step increases in income inequality
- And inequality influences the business cycle
  - Countries with higher inequality have deeper recessions
  - In countries with higher inequality:
    - Fiscal policy is less counter cyclical
    - Monetary policy easing is less effective
- Policies that **reduce the incidence of recessions** a first line of defense against inequality
- Keeping inequality in check also key to assure that stabilisation policies (fiscal and monetary) are ultimately effective



# **Reserve slides**

# Inequality $\rightarrow$ steeper declines in consumption during recessions

Recessions, consumption and income inequality					
Dependent variable: per capita consumption growth					
	all countries	developing			
lagged dependent variable	0.547***	0.526***			
	0.030	0.033			
income share of top 10%	0.014	0.003			
	0.076	0.092			
recession	-2.188***	-3.199***			
	0.570	0.781			
income share of top 10% * recession	-0.169***	-0.177***			
	0.020	0.026			
observations	1495	953			
number of countries	84	63			
R2	0.633	0.617			
R2 between	0.796	0.786			
R2 within	0.548	0.549			

Note: Estimated on yearly data since 1990. Cluster-robust standard errors are shown below coefficients. \*\*\*/\*\*/\* denote statistical significance at 1/5/10% confidence level.

# From Micro to Macro:

# Heterogeneity and the depth of recessions

#### Literature

- Consumption smoothing over the cycle is far from perfect
  - Large changes in consumption occur after actual changes in income, not only when changes become known (Jappelli and Pistaferri 2010)
  - Liquidity constraints are important, particularly for lower income households
  - Significant share of "hand-to-mouth" consumers
    - Also preferences play a prominent role in differences in MPCs across consumers (Aguiar et al 2020)
- Key fact: very large cross-sectional heterogeneity in MPCs (Landais 2021)

 $\rightarrow$  Suggests that inequality could matter, particularly during downturns

# Cross-country estimation results

	Consumption growth over		
	t–1 to t	t–1 to t+1	t–1 to t+2
monetary policy shock <sub>t</sub>	-3.862***	-6.195**	-7.248**
	(1.309)	(2.512)	(3.409)
mp shock <sub>t</sub> * income share of top 10%	0.136***	0.204**	0.204
	(0.046)	(0.092)	(0.127)
estimated differential effect for a one std deviation mp shock (75th–25th percentile)	0.167*** (0.053)	0.252** (0.113)	0.252 (0.156)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.723	0.560	0.449

Entries in the table show the estimated response of the growth in real (per capita) consumption over the specified horizon to a monetary policy shock of 100 basis points in year t (see the annex text for details). Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in parentheses below coefficients. \*/\*\*/\*\*\* denotes statistical significance at 10/5/1% level, respectively.

Source: authors' calculations

### US estimation results Full sample (1969 to 2008)

Real personal income growth from	t-1 to t	t-1 to t+1	t-1 to t+2
	1 - 0 - 0 + +		74 100+++
m.p. snocк <sub>t</sub>	-15.920^^	-42.865^^^	-/4.126^^^
	(4.741)	(6.681)	(8.390)
m.p. shock <sub>t</sub> $*$ income share of top 10%	0.373**	1.058***	1.964***
	(0.117)	(0.166)	(0.211)
estimated differential effect for a one std deviation mp shock (75th–25th percentile)	0.281*** (0.088)	0.797*** (0.125)	1.480*** (0.159)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.175	0.348	0.303

### US estimation results Controlling for unemployment and social spending (1990 to 2008)

Real personal income growth from	t-1 to t	t-1 to t+1	t-1 to t+2
m.p. shock <sub>t</sub>	-23.757***	-41.850***	-39.825***
	(6.133)	(8.232)	(10.721)
m.p. shock <sub>t</sub> * income share of top			
10%	0.516**	1.023***	1.131***
	(0.155)	(0.206)	(0.266)
estimated differential effect for a one			
std deviation mp shock	0.388***	0.770***	0.852***
(75th–25th percentile)	(0.117)	(0.155)	(0.200)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.351	0.548	0.504

Taxes and transfers reduce Gini inequality levels



In many countries, taxes and transfers significantly dampen fluctuations in Gini inequality



 Fiscal policy has a large impact on inequality. This can be observed by comparing before and after-tax & transfers income inequality:

Tax progressivity matters for inequality, overall tax burden does not



# Higher UI replacement rate comes with lower Gini index



 Part of this impact relates to differences in income tax progressivity and unemployment insurance generosity. low tax progressivity and/or low unemployment replacement ratio are systematically associated with high inequality pass-through

Progressive taxes raise fiscal balance sensitivity to the business cycle, particularly in expansions



High replacement ratio also raises fiscal balance

sensitivity to the output gap, driven by expansions

 High progressivity and/or high unemployment replacement ratios make fiscal policy react more strongly to the business cycle, particularly in expansions

Below median replacement ratio



• Yet, tax progressivity and unemployment insurance generosity also affect fiscal policy capacity to stabilize the business cycle

- Conclusions: Redistributive policies deliver three goodies
  - They help reduce inequality
  - They make fiscal policy more anti-cyclical, which promotes long-run growth
  - They help rebuild fiscal space more quickly in expansions, which reduces the pace of public debt accumulation and improves fiscal sustainability
- Policy implications/stakes
  - Evidence that redistribution negative supply-side effects outweigh the positive impacts described above has yet to be developed
  - However, in practise, strong redistribution is difficult in the presence of location arbitrage and/or tax optimisation