Monetary policy rules and the inequality-augmented Phillips curve

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Introduction

Model structure

Inflation-Unemployment-Inequality nexus

Flattening of the Phillips curve

MP reaction functions

Conclusions

 Standard macroeconomic literature addresses MP choices based on the relationship between unemployment and inflation. In this paper we add a third dimension to this relationship: income inequality;

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- Low-wage workers are more exposed to cyclical fluctuations in unemployment (Clark and Summers, 1980, Kydland, 1984, Mitchell et al., 1985, Mueller, 2017, Solon et al. 1994, Okun et al., 1973);
- This heterogeneous effect can have distributive implications.

 We explore the inflation-unemployment-inequality nexus to investigate the role of changes in workers' bargaining power for the shape of the Phillips curve and expand the analysis of the trade-offs faced by the CBs;

- We explore the inflation-unemployment-inequality nexus to investigate the role of changes in workers' bargaining power for the shape of the Phillips curve and expand the analysis of the trade-offs faced by the CBs;
- To do so, we consider workers' heterogeneity in an extended version of the SFC-AB model by Rolim et al. (2023) with no long-term growth.

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- Direct workers to produce goods:

$$L_{c,t}^{D,dir} = \left\lceil \frac{Q_{c,t}^d}{y^c} \right\rceil; \tag{1}$$

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 Indirect workers supervise those workers and manage the firm (overhead labor):

$$L_{c,t}^{D,ind} = \lfloor \rho_2 L_{c,t}^{D,dir} + \rho_3 L_{c,t}^{dir,fc} \rceil;$$
(2)

Note: $L_{c,t}^{dir,fc}$ is the demand for direct worker at full capacity utilization (proxy for production capacity).

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- · Investment is based on desired capacity utilization rate;
- Firms exit the market depending on specific criteria.

• Sets interest rate for loans at the same level as CB (*i*);

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- Grants credit to all creditworthy clients (C firms and households): evaluation depends on interest payments to revenue ratio relative to *R* threshold.

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• Consumption depends on income (class-specific propensity to consume) and on emulation consumption (average consumption of class above).

Inflation targeting regime:

$$i_{t} = i_{t-1} \{ 1 + \lambda_{1} (\hat{\hat{p}}_{t-1} - \hat{p}^{T}) - \lambda_{2} [(1 - \bar{\eta})_{t-1} - (1 - \eta)^{T}] \}$$
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Wage setting:

$$w_{f,t}^{j,\$} = (1 - \phi^j \eta_{j,t-1}) w_{f,t}^{j,d,\$} + \phi^j \eta_{j,t-1} w_{f,t}^{j,s,\$}$$
(5)

Note: $w_{f,t}^{j,d,\$}$ is firms' desired wage, $w_{f,t}^{j,s,\$}$ is workers' desired wage, ϕ^j is the class-specific parameter, and $\eta_{j,t-1}$ is the class-specific employment rate. $\phi^j \eta_{j,t-1}$ is the **class-specific bargaining power**.

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Inflation-Unemployment-Inequality nexus

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- Analysis is based on stylized facts concerning key variables which are reproduced by the model (validation).
- Model is simulated for 500 periods (200 transient periods and 300 considered periods);
- 100 Monte Carlo runs per simulation configuration.

Cyclical behavior of macroeconomic series



Workers' heterogeneity



Unemployment rate per class

Wage share per class

Phillips curve



Unemployment-Inequality curve



Inequality-augmented Phillips curve



Generalized inequality-augmented Phillips curve



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- This would also explain the worsening in income distribution (Stansbury and Summers, 2020);
- Similar argument is made in a TANK model with Kaleckian features (Ratner and Sim., 2022);
- The PK tradition has long emphasized this (Setterfield, 2005, Setterfield and Blecker, 2022, Setterfield and Lovejoy, 2006, Summa and Braga, 2020);

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We explore the implications of lower bargaining power of low-wage workers by applying a **one-time permanent negative shock** at t = 100 to ϕ^{dir} . For numerous reasons, institutional changes may have had a stronger effect on the **bargaining power of the low-wage workers**.

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Experiments configuration: direct workers' bargaining power shocks

Exp.	1	2	3	4	5	6
$\Delta \phi^{ m dir}$	0	-0.02	-0.04	-0.06	-0.08	-0.1

Income inequality



Wage share

Mark-up C sector

Wage share per class



Direct workers

Indirect workers

Income inequality



Wage Gini

Gross Income Gini

Macroeconomic variables



Inflation rate

Unemployment rate

Phillips curve



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Changes in monetary policy reaction function

The inflation-unemployment-inequality nexus suggests that monetary policy management has important implications for inequality. The inflation-unemployment-inequality nexus suggests that monetary policy management has important implications for inequality. We explore this by comparing **dovish and hawkish** scenarios. The inflation-unemployment-inequality nexus suggests that monetary policy management has important implications for inequality. We explore this by comparing **dovish and hawkish** scenarios.

Experiments configuration: monetary policy reaction function parameters

Exp.	Baseline	Hawks	Doves
λ_1	1	1	0
λ_2	0.2	0	0.2

In all scenarios: $\hat{p}^T = 0.01$ and $u^T = 0.05$.

Macroeconomic and inequality variables



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• Empirical regularities suggest the validity of the inequality-augmented Phillips curve;

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- Income inequality ought to be considered a relevant dimension when analyzing the macroeconomic effects of monetary policy and the Phillips curve in general.

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Inflation rate

Inflation rate



Baseline

Hawkish

Dovish

Unemployment rate



Baseline

Hawkish

Dovish

Parameters (1)

Symbol	Description	Value
Cymbol	consitivity of workers desired wage to employment rate	0.02
· 7	sensitivity of workers desired wage to employment rate	0.02
	entrant infins expected sales share of sector average sales (C sector)	0.5
$(1 - \eta)^{*}$	unemployment rate target	0.05
ΰ	employees turnover snare	0.05
λ_1	sensitivity of nominal interest rate to inflation gap	1
λ_2	sensitivity of nominal interest rate to unemployment gap	0.2
$\mu_{c,0}$	initial mark-up rate (C firms)	0.6
μ_k	mark-up rate (K firm)	0.5
ν_1	sensitivity of mark-up rate to market share (C firms)	0.01
ν_2	mark-up deviation persistence (C firms)	0.95
ν_3	sensitivity of mark-up deviation to unit costs (C firms)	0.2
ν_4	sensitivity of market share to competitiveness (C firms)	1
ρ_1	managers per direct workers (K firms)	0.16
ρ_2	indirect workers per direct worker (C firms)	0.085
ρ_3	indirect workers per direct worker at full capacity production (C firms)	0.065
ρ_4	number of capitalists per firm*	1
<i>Q</i> 1	initial ratio between direct workers wage and minimum wage	2.5
<i>Q</i> 2	initial ratio between indirect workers wage and direct workers wage	2.5
τ	tax rate on income	0.05
$\phi^{\textit{dir,ind}}$	sensitivity of workers' bargaining power to employment rate for direct and indirect workers respectively	(0.4, 0.4)
ω1,2,3,4	sensitivity of expected demand to past demand (C firms)	(0.4, 0.3, 0.2, 0.1)
C1	consumption emulation weight	0.12
$C_2^{dir,ind,cap}$	propensity to consume out of income (direct workers, indirect workers, capitalists)	(0.95, 0.85, 0.75)
i ₀	initial nominal interest rate	0.02
i ^{min}	minimum nominal interest rate	1e-07
$L_q^{dir,ind}$	workers hired as public servants *	(239, 39)
ms ^{min}	minimum market share to stay in the market (C firms)	0.0025

Parameters (2)

Symbol	Description	Value
N ^c	number of consumption goods firms	200
N ^{dir,ind,cap}	number of direct workers, indirect workers*, and capitalists*	(1696,286,201)
n ^{dir,ind}	percentage of direct and indirect workers in total population	(0.844, 0.142)
n ^g	proportion of public servants in total initial employment (direct workers)	0.16
n ^{IN}	desired share of inventories	0.1
n ^{s,dir,ind}	proportion of workers in survey	(0.15, 0.3)
n ^w	number of hiring rounds per open position	1.5
\bar{p}^{T}	inflation target	0.01
$Q_{c,0}^{fc}$	initial full capacity production (C firms)	80
Q_m^{fc}	machines production at full capacity	2.5
R	maximum interest payments to cash flow ratio	0.05
T^{c}	number of periods before a new firm can exit the market	10
T^i	number of periods for average variables in monetary policy reaction function	4
T^k	machines lifetime	20
и ^d	desired capacity utilization level	0.8
V	expansion investment speed of adjustment	0.2
$W_0^{min,\$}$	initial minimum wage	1
У ^с	productivity at C sector	10
У ^к	productivity at K sector	10