U.S. Monetary Policy's Distributional Impacts: Evaluating Wealth and Employment Outcomes by Race and Gender

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Motivation

Is monetary policy "identity neutral" in its effects?

Some policymakers are calling for the potential distributional consequences to be examined alongside MP's demand management effects (Bostic 2020).

Research Questions

- How do monetary policy shocks affect relative unemployment rates and wealth by race and gender in the United States?
- What are the mechanisms that explain the labor market effects?
- Do the answers change when considering unconventional MP?

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Social Stratification and MP Impacts

A change in the federal funds rate could differentially impact women and Black workers via multiple channels. The implied directions (more + or less - sensitive) vary and are potentially asymmetric.

Unemployment rates

- + Job precarity
- + Discrimination
- Industrial composition

Net worth

- ? Labor income
- Portfolio composition
- +/- Differential returns

Empirical Literature

- Contractionary policy increases racial unemployment gap; mixed evidence regarding gender gap.
- Portfolio effects of CMP decrease wealth gap (Bartscher et al 2022)
- No work on unconventional MP post-2007.

Detailed review of literature

Most work has used time-series methodologies: VAR, IV-LP

Two recent papers on MP exploit fact that policy is set at national level but outcomes can be observed at the state level \rightarrow **panel data approaches**

Empirical Literature

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Detailed review of literature

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Two recent papers on MP exploit fact that policy is set at national level but outcomes can be observed at the state level \rightarrow panel data approaches

1. Baseline panel data estimation

$$y_{ijt} = \alpha_i + \gamma_j + \theta_j r_{t-1} + \beta \mathbf{X}_{ijt} + \epsilon_{ijt}$$

for gender/race group j in state i in year t where t = 1980, ..., 2007Panel extended to 2019 to examine unconventional MP using shadow rates

 y_{ijt} = unemployment rate/measure of net worth r_{t-1} = nominal federal funds rate (percentage points) X_{ijt} = additional covariates Errors clustered at state/group levels

2. Analysis using state-specific monetary policy measure (Cooper, Luengo-Prado, and Olivei 2022) • Details Solution: Identify MP shocks via differentials in state impacts of MP

<u>Step 1</u>: Estimate interest rate r_{it}^* that closes unemployment gap in t + 2<u>Step 2</u>: Estimate baseline model using time FEs and relative MP stance: $\tilde{r}_{it} = r_{it} - r_{it}^*$ where r_{it} is real FFR using state-specific inflation measure

Identifying assumptions:

- a. State economies have different sensitivities to monetary policy shocks
- b. Monetary policy is set in response to national economic conditions, not state idiosyncrasies.

3. Mediator analysis (adapted from Leahy and Thapar 2022) Panel data can be used to identify heterogeneity in first-order effects. Time FEs absorb common MP impacts and national economic conditions.

$$u_{ijt} = \alpha_i + \gamma_j + \eta_t + \theta_j \tilde{r}_{it-1} + \xi_j z_{it-1} + \omega_j z_{it-1} \tilde{r}_{it-1} + \beta \mathbf{X}_{itj} + \epsilon_{ijt}$$

for gender/race group j in state i in year t where t = 1980, ..., 2007

 $u_{ijt} =$ unemployment rate $z_{it} =$ one of three mediator variables Errors clustered at state/group level

▶ Variable list

Microeconomic data

Microdata aggregated to the state-race-gender-year level: Black men, black women, white men, white women (Seguino and Heintz 2012)

CPS Annual Social and Economic Supplement

- Employment status for individuals
- Gender, race
- 1980 2007
- Approx. 150,000 observations per year

Panel Study of Income Dynamics

- Household wealth outcomes
- HH structure, race
- 1984, 1989, 1994, 1999-2007 biennially
- Approx. 7000 observations per year

Final panel: 4 race-gender categories \times 28 or 7 years \times *S* States

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Aggregation to the state level

Sample Sizes: N varies widely across state-race-gender-year observations, esp. PSID.

CPS histogram

Wealth:

Heavily skewed to the right, increases variance; worse with small N



- 18.7% of observations are missing in PSID; 2.5% in CPS
- Drop states where at least one observation has N < 5: 19 states remain in PSID, 41 in CPS • States included • Sensitivity Analysis

Summary Statistics

Panel A: CPS Sample

	White men	Black men	Black women	White women	Total
Unemployment rate	6.020	14.83	12.31	5.045	9.549
	(2.631)	(10.18)	(8.963)	(2.025)	(8.111)
Labor force	79.70	76.89	69.25	65.27	72.78
participation rate	(3.341)	(7.250)	(8.295)	(5.166)	(8.556)
Real GSP growth	2.957	2.957	2.957	2.957	2.957
	(2.987)	(2.987)	(2.987)	(2.987)	(2.986)
N	1148	1148	1148	1148	4592

Panel B: PSID Sample

	White men	Black men	Black women	White women	Total
Average household	304869.3	84211.0	34603.0	134679.0	139590.6
wealth	(200516.1)	(187283.6)	(79366.8)	(93290.4)	(181201.9)
Median household	118064.0	21457.6	5266.8	50901.7	48922.5
wealth	(73699.0)	(18573.0)	(7463.3)	(50714.4)	(62887.7)
Log of average	12.44	10.82	9.850	11.59	11.18
household wealth	(0.607)	(0.830)	(1.029)	(0.669)	(1.247)
N	152	152	152	152	608

Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Averages are unweighted. Samples are limited to states that meet cutoff threshold of N = 5 for each dataset.

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Cooper, Luengo-Prado, and Olivei (2022)

A one p.p. increase in interest rate gap = a one p.p. increase in real FFR relative to eq. rate = relatively contractionary MP

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Unemployment	Average	Median	Logged
	Rate	Wealth	Wealth	Wealth
L.Rate gap	0.528***	-32985.6**	-7999.0**	-0.0626
	(0.143)	(14490.3)	(3853.8)	(0.0450)
Black men \times L.Rate gap	0.781***	10877.4	6900.5**	-0.0162
	(0.119)	(14766.6)	(2943.8)	(0.0414)
Black women \times L.Rate gap	0.641***	31902.4***	6101.1**	-0.0459
	(0.114)	(8443.6)	(2716.4)	(0.0372)
White women $ imes$ L.Rate gap	-0.0328	28306.3***	3630.9	0.0168
	(0.0483)	(8710.5)	(3035.4)	(0.0251)
Time FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4592	532	532	532
Adjusted R-squared	0.452	0.519	0.779	0.770

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at the * 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1% levels. Aggregation threshold used is N = 5.

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Nonetary Policy's Distributional Impacts

Alternative observation thresholds

N = 10

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Unemployment	Average	Median	Logged
	Rate	Wealth	Wealth	Wealth
L.Rate gap	0.741***	-45857.7**	-10650.1**	-0.0996*
Black men × L.Rate gap	0.602***	1851.9	5358.8*	-0.0358
Black women × L.Rate gap	0.522***	30547.2***	5530.4*	-0.0620
White women × L.Rate gap	-0.00681	26666.8***	3596.0	0.0189
Observations	3808	420	420	420
N = 20				
L.Rate gap	0.749***	-33020.7**	-11666.3**	-0.121**
Black men × L.Rate gap	0.623***	9345.9	4567.0	-0.0382
Black women × L.Rate gap	0.546***	26065.5**	5228.9	-0.0639*
White women × L.Rate gap	-0.0533	24981.0**	4514.2	0.0174
Observations	3360	280	280	280

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Leahy and Thapar (2022): Mediator Analysis

 z_{it-1} = one of three mediator variables

- a. Black share of the state population in state *i* and year t 1 (Census), quadratic form (Dysmki and Aldana 2014; Seguino and Heintz 2012)
- b. Share of non-farm employment in manufacturing and construction in state i and year t - 1 (BEA)
- c. Gap in bank branches per 100,000 people (FDIC, 1994 onward):

$$\mathit{bdgap}_{it-1} = \mathit{bd}^{\mathit{b}}_{it-1} - \mathit{bd}^{\mathit{a}}_{it-1}$$

where bd_{it-1}^{b} is bank density in counties with above median black population share for state i in year t-1 (and conversely for bd_{it-1}^a)

Histograms of mediators Act Back



Notes: Each column presents results from separate regression with interaction of mediator variable and race-gender groups. Bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.

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Conclusions

- Contractionary monetary policy shocks disproportionately increase unemployment rate for Black men and women in the U.S.
- Mediator analysis
 - Larger Black population share or smaller manufacturing/construction employment share reduces effect
 - Competition over scarce jobs may play a role in results (Chelwa, Hamilton, and Stewart 2022; Seguino and Heintz 2012)
- Contractionary policy does not reduce racial wealth gap as predicted by portfolio effect. Possibly larger relative wealth losses for black women.

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Conclusions

Unconventional monetary policy Shadow rate results

- Wu-Xia shadow rates are used to extend panel to 1980-2019.
- Overall results hold
- No evidence of distributional effects in 2008-2019 period specifically
- The distributional impacts of monetary policy may be mixed and should be part of the discussion of policy costs.

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A change in the federal funds rate could differentially impact women and Black workers via multiple channels. The implied directions (more + or less - sensitive) vary and are potentially asymmetric.

Unemployment rates

- + Job precarity
- + Discrimination
- Industrial composition

Net worth

- ? Labor income
- Portfolio composition
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Empirical Literature • Back

Study	Geography	Time Period	Methodology	Monetary Policy Variable	Results:
Hull (1983)	United States	1968-1981	Correlations	Monetary base	CMP <mark>increases</mark> black-white unemployment gap
Abell (1991)	United States	1974-1987	VAR	M2 money supply	EMP decreases unemployment more for <mark>white men</mark> and <mark>black women</mark>
Zavodny and	United	1972-1999	Bayesian VAR	Shock to federal funds rate	CMP increases unemployment more for
Zha (2000)	States				black workers in <mark>absolute</mark> but <mark>not</mark> relative terms
Thorbecke	United	1973-1996	VAR, narrative	Shock to federal funds rate,	CMP increases unemployment rates for
(2001)	States		evidence, Romer- Romer method	Romer & Romer series	black and Hispanic workers more than white workers
Carpenter and	United	1973-2002	VAR, narrative	Shock to federal funds rate,	CMP decreases employment-population
Rodgers (2004)	States		evidence, Romer- Romer method	Romer & Romer series	ratio of black workers more than white workers
Braunstein and	Developing	1971-2002	Trends from	Deflation, interest rate,	CMP decreases employment more for
Heintz (2008)	economies		contractionary episodes	money supply	women than men
Takhtamanova	OECD	1980-2004	Single equation	Short-term interest rate	CMP has no gendered impact on
and Sierminska (2009)	countries		regression, VAR		employment
Seguino and	United	1979-2008	Two-stage	Federal funds rate	CMP increases unemployment ratio for
Heintz (2012)	States		estimation, state- level panel data		black men, black women, and white women rel. to white men
Bartscher et al.	United	1972-2008	Instrumental variable	Extended Romer-Romer	EMP increases wealth more for white
(2022)	States	(2019 SCF	local projection	series as instrument for	households, increases employment and
		Data)		FFR	earnings more for black households

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2. Analysis using state-specific monetary policy measure (Cooper, Luengo-Prado, and Olivei 2022) Solution: Identify MP shocks via differentials in state impacts of MP

Stage 1: Estimate equilibrium rate of interest for state *i*

$$u_{it} = \phi_i + \zeta_t + \lambda_{1i}u_{it-1} + \lambda_{2i}u_{it-2} + \nu_i r_{it-1} + \epsilon_{it}$$

for state i in year t where t = 1980, ..., 2007

 u_{it} = unemployment rate in year t - unemployment rate in 1995/96 r_{it-1} = smoothed real federal funds rate (nominal - % Δ GSP deflator) \rightarrow Rate that closes unemployment gap in two years: r_{it}^*

Stage 2: Estimate model from 1. using relative MP stance: $\tilde{r}_{it} = r_{it} - r_{it}^*$

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List of covariates and data sources

Interest Rate Smoothing				
Variable	Data Source			
Dependent: Percent change in GSP deflator	BEA			
Percent change in Core PCE Index	BEA			
Relative growth rate in year <i>t</i> : real GSP growth - US GDP growth	BEA			
Relative growth rate in year $t-1$				

State IS Curve				
Variable		Data Source		
Dependent: Unemployment g unemployment rate in state i unemployment rate in state i	ap = Average in year <i>t</i> - average in 1995/96	BEA		
Unemployment gap in year t	- 1	BEA		
Unemployment gap in year t	- 2	BEA		
Real federal funds rate in yea nominal federal funds rate - s inflation rate	t = tmoothed state	Federal Reserve Board of Governors		

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List of covariates and data sources

Unemployment Regressions				
Variable	Data Source			
<i>Dependent:</i> Unemployment rate for group <i>j</i> in state <i>i</i> and year <i>t</i>	CPS (1980 - 2007)			
Reverse rate gap, federal funds rate, or Romer & Romer residuals	Derived, FR Board of Governors, or Wieland and Yang (2019)			
Unemployment rate for group j in state i and year $t-1$	CPS (1980 - 2007)			
LFPR for group j in state i and year t	CPS (1980 - 2007)			
Real GSP growth in state i and year t	BEA			
Real GSP growth in state i and year $t-1$	BEA			

Wealth	Regressions
Variable	Data Source
Dependent: Average, median, or log of avera wealth for group <i>j</i> in state <i>i</i> and year <i>t</i>	ge PSID (1984, 1989, 1994, 1999-2007 biennially)
Reverse rate gap, federal funds rate, or Romer & Romer residuals	Derived, FR Board of Governors, or Wieland and Yang (2019)
Average, median, or log of average wealth for group j in state i and year $t - 2$ or t - 5 (see data source)	PSID (1984, 1989, 1994, 1999-2007 biennially)
Real GSP growth in state i and year t	BEA
Real GSP growth in state i and year $t-1$	BEA



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List of covariates and data sources

Mechanism Analysis				
<i>Dependent:</i> Unemployment rate for group <i>j</i> in state <i>i</i> and year <i>t</i>	CPS (1980 - 2007)			
Reverse rate gap, federal funds rate, or Romer & Romer residuals	Derived, FR Board of Governors, or Wieland and Yang (2019)			
Unemployment rate for group j in state i and year $t-1$	CPS (1980 - 2007)			
Real GSP growth in state <i>i</i> and year <i>t</i>	BEA			
Real GSP growth in state i and year $t-1$	BEA			
Share of employment in manufacturing and construction in state i and year $t-1$	BEA			
Black share of the state population in state i and year $t - 1$, quadratic form	Census			
Bank density gap	FDIC (1994-2007)			

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States included in analysis

	CPS	PSID
(Une	employment Regressions)	(Wealth Regressions)
AK	MS	CA
AL	NC	FL
AR	NE	GA
AZ	NJ	IL
CA	NM	IN
CO	NV	MD
СТ	NY	MI
DC	ОН	MO
DE	OK	MS
FL	OR	NC
GA	PA	NY
IA	RI	OH
IL	SC	PA
IN	TN	SC
KS	ТХ	ТХ
KY	VA	VA
LA	WA	
MA	WI	
MD	WV	
MI		
MN		
MO		

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Histograms of observations by sample size, CPS



Notes: Histograms omit observations where N = 0. Red line indicates cutoff threshold of N = 5, such that states with any gender-race-year observations with fewer than 5 individual or household observations are dropped from the analysis.

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Baseline regression results

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Unemployment	Average	Median	Logged
	Rate	Wealth	Wealth	Wealth
L.Nominal FFR	0.181***	-18074.6***	-5630.8***	-0.0386**
	(0.0226)	(6225.4)	(1555.9)	(0.0176)
Black men $ imes$ L.Nominal FFR	0.369***	4106.9	6788.8***	0.0185
	(0.0785)	(9852.5)	(1842.8)	(0.0316)
Black women $ imes$ L.Nominal FFR	0.362***	11798.3**	6038.2***	-0.0426
	(0.0902)	(5251.3)	(1475.0)	(0.0326)
White women \times L.Nominal FFR	-0.0301	9982.0*	3400.3*	-0.0155
	(0.0406)	(5308.4)	(1891.3)	(0.0192)
Time FEs	No	No	No	No
Observations	4592	532	532	532
Adjusted R-squared	0.412	0.488	0.638	0.756

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at the * 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1% levels. Regressions control for current and lagged real GSP growth, the lagged value of the dependent variable, and group and state fixed effects. "Men" are "male- or dual-headed" and "women" are "female-headed HHs" in wealth regressions. Errors are clustered at the group-state level. Aggregation threshold used is N = 5, where any state that has one or more race-gender-state-year observations below N is dropped from the sample.

Smoothed Inflation Rate

- 1. Estimate smoothed measure of state-level inflation
 - GSP deflator calculated using BEA estimates of real and nominal GSP
 - Inflation is calculated as the annual percentage change in the GSP deflator
 - Smoothed inflation measure calculated as the fitted values of the following regression:

$$i_{it} = \alpha_i + \mu p_t + \tilde{g}_{it} + \tilde{g}_{it-1} + \epsilon_{it}$$

where i_{it} is the state inflation rate, α_i is a state FE, p_t is the core PCE inflation rate for the U.S., and \tilde{g}_{it} is the difference between real GSP growth and U.S. GDP growth in year *t*.

Estimates are weighted based on the size of the labor force in state i in year t.



Cooper, Luengo-Prado, and Olivei (2022)



Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at the *10%, **5%, and ***1% levels. State inflation rate calculated as percentage change in GSP deflator. State fixed effects not shown. Full panel of 50 states and Washington D.C. is used, covering period between 1980 and 2007.

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Smoothed Inflation Rate: Regression Results

	State Inflation Rate
Core PCE inflation (%)	0.969*** (0.0164)
Relative real GSP growth (%)	0.0702*** (0.0159)
L.Relative real GSP growth (%)	-0.0209 (0.0160)
Constant	0.138 (0.246)
Observations R ²	1428 0.721

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at the * 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1% levels. State inflation rate calculated as percentage change in GSP deflator. State fixed effects not shown. Full panel of 50 states and Washington D.C. is used, covering period between 1980 and 2007.



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Cooper, Luengo-Prado, and Olivei (2022)

2. Estimate state-level IS curve \rightarrow equilibrium rate of interest r_{it}^* that closes unemployment rate gap in two years \blacktriangleright Details

	mean/sd	min	max	count
Interest rate coefficient	0.333 (0.0648)	0.209	0.527	51
Unemployment rate gap t-1 coefficient	0.977 (0.145)	0.584	1.345	51
Unemployment rate gap t-2 coefficient	-0.255 (0.156)	-0.520	0.219	51
Total unemployment rate gap effect	0.722 (0.1000)	0.504	0.935	51
State fixed effect coefficient	0.0871 (0.206)	-0.624	0.380	51
Two-year interest rate effect	0.992 (0.208)	0.596	1.659	51

 Notes: Coefficients are estimated by regressing the unemployment rate gap in state *i* in year *t* on two lags of the unemployment ^C

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Estimated Interest Rate Effect by State

F test rejects null that interest rate effects are equal $(p = 0.002) \rightarrow \text{Back}$



Notes: Bars indicate standard errors.

Calculating Equilibrium Interest Rate

Cooper, Luengo-Prado, and Olivei (2022) show that, by iterating the IS curve equation forward two periods, the rate of interest that will close the unemployment gap in two years can be calculated as

$$egin{aligned} r_{it}^* &= -\left[(\lambda_{1i}^2+\lambda_{2i}^2)u_{it}+\lambda_{1i}\lambda_{2i}u_{it-1}
ight] imes(rac{1}{\lambda_{1i}
u_i+
u_i})\ &-(1+\lambda_{1i})\phi_i imes(rac{1}{\lambda_{1i}
u_i+
u_i}) \end{aligned}$$



Aggregate real GDP growth and average equilibrium rates



Notes: The equilibrium interest rate is calculated from the derived state-level IS curve coefficients as described in Cooper, Luengo-Prado, and Olivei (2022). Yearly averages are unweighted.



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Economic Significance

Average rate gap is 3.85 percentage points (SD = 2.89).

Effect size of 1 SD rate gap change relative to average unemployment rate is:

- White men = 25.4%
- White women = 30.2%
- Black men = 25.4%
- Black women = 27.4%

Results indicate economically significant effects within groups and absolute differences in effects across groups.

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Leahy and Thapar (2022): Mediator Analysis



Notes: Sample omits states with any race-gender-state-year observations including fewer than 5 individuals or households based on the CPS sample.





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	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Unemployment	Average	Median	Logged
	Rate	Wealth	Wealth	Wealth
L.Nominal FFR	0.00210	1466.8	-539.8	0.0114
	(0.0320)	(6036.9)	(2040.5)	(0.0181)
Black men $ imes$ L.Nominal FFR	-0.0121	-11232.3	2397.3	0.00687
	(0.136)	(11355.4)	(2369.4)	(0.0367)
Black women $ imes$ L.Nominal FFR	0.136	-4255.7	1424.0	-0.0461
	(0.163)	(6410.4)	(1913.4)	(0.0374)
White women $ imes$ L.Nominal FFR	-0.00626	-554.2	2480.6	-0.0180
	(0.0368)	(5922.2)	(2389.3)	(0.0202)
Year	-0.0897***	14434.0***	1664.4**	0.0387***
	(0.0151)	(2348.4)	(782.8)	(0.00592)
Black men $ imes$ Year	-0.207***	-11649.8***	-1466.2*	-0.00625
	(0.0563)	(2364.8)	(805.9)	(0.0105)
Black women $ imes$ Year	-0.126*	-12468.0***	-1426.0*	0.00399
	(0.0676)	(2505.1)	(782.2)	(0.0135)
White women \times Year	0.0106	-8456.2***	-85.13	-0.00189
	(0.0213)	(2432.4)	(889.0)	(0.00833)
Time FEs	No	No	No	No
Observations	4592	532	532	532
Adjusted R-squared	0.421	0.521	0.775	0.770

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at the *10%, **5%, and ***1% levels. Regressions also control for current and lagged real GSP growth, the lagged value of the dependent variable, and group and state fixed effects. "Men" are "male- or dual-headed" and "women" are "female-headed HHs" in wealth regressions. Errors are clustered at the group-state level. Aggregation threshold used is N = 5, where any state that has one or more race-gender-state-year observations below N is dropped from the sample.



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	(1)	(2)	(3) Average	(4) Median	(5) Logged
	Unemploym	nent Rate	Wealth	Wealth	Wealth
L.Rate gap	0.107**	0.582***	-26920.9*	-7424.5*	-0.0630
	(0.0450)	(0.137)	(13734.6)	(3894.2)	(0.0459)
Black men $ imes$ L.Rate gap	0.690***	0.711***	841.7	5715.0*	-0.0279
	(0.131)	(0.139)	(15179.3)	(3030.4)	(0.0429)
Black women $ imes$ L.Rate gap	0.486***	0.510***	22609.6**	5098.0*	-0.0370
	(0.159)	(0.166)	(8650.8)	(2788.2)	(0.0405)
White women \times L.Rate gap	-0.0462	-0.0467	22623.6**	3646.0	0.0212
	(0.0553)	(0.0573)	(8730.3)	(3291.8)	(0.0278)
Year	-0.0671***	0.00500	11004.5***	1259.6	0.0318***
	(0.0130)	(0.0184)	(2311.3)	(798.1)	(0.00804)
Black men $ imes$ Year	-0.0290	-0.0347	-9667.6***	-1374.2**	-0.0105
	(0.0355)	(0.0371)	(1906.2)	(667.9)	(0.00925)
Black women $ imes$ Year	-0.0563	-0.0654	-9580.6***	-1221.5*	0.00892
	(0.0525)	(0.0533)	(2109.7)	(666.0)	(0.0128)
White women \times Year	0.0000340	-0.00780	-6158.4***	-205.6	0.00383
	(0.0228)	(0.0216)	(2083.0)	(736.0)	(0.00864)
Time FEs	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4592	4592	532	532	532
Adjusted R-squared	0.433	0.452	0.529	0.781	0.770

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at the * 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1% levels. Regressions also control for current and lagged real GSP growth, the lagged value of the dependent variable, and group and state fixed effects. "Men" are "male- or dual-headed" and "women" are "female-headed HHs" in wealth regressions. Errors are clustered at the group-state level. Aggregation threshold used is N = 5, where any state that has one or more race-gender-state-year observations below N is dropped from the sample.



Alternative observation thresholds

N = 1

	(1) Unemployment Rate	(2) Average Wealth	(3) Median Wealth	(4) Logged Wealth
L.Rate gap	0.526***	-19217.5**	-7047.4***	0.0739
Black men $ imes$ L.Rate gap	0.778***	9341.6	7380.5***	0.00531
Black women $ imes$ L.Rate gap	0.624***	23539.1***	6169.0***	0.0398
White women \times L.Rate gap	-0.0413	21363.0***	4851.9*	0.0539
Observations	4699	672	672	672
N = 5				
L.Rate gap	0.528***	-32985.6**	-7999.0**	-0.0626
Black men $ imes$ L.Rate gap	0.781***	10877.4	6900.5**	-0.0162
Black women $ imes$ L.Rate gap	0.641***	31902.4***	6101.1**	-0.0459
White women \times L.Rate gap	-0.0328	28306.3***	3630.9	0.0168
Observations	4592	532	532	532

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Alternative observation thresholds

N = 35

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Unemployment	Average	Median	Logged
	Rate	Wealth	Wealth	Wealth
L.Rate gap	0.641***	-59148.4***	-18261.4*	-0.321**
Black men × L.Rate gap	0.565***	30530.5	16357.6	0.0486
Black women × L.Rate gap	0.522***	21266.6	14887.7	-0.123***
White women × L.Rate gap	-0.0513	18031.7	13610.6	-0.0193
Observations	2688	56	56	56

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at the * 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1% levels. Regressions also control for current and lagged real GSP growth, the lagged value of the dependent variable, and group and state fixed effects. "Men" are "male- or dual-headed" and "women" are "female-headed HHs" in wealth regressions. Errors are clustered at the group-state level. Any state that has one or more race-gender-state-year observations below N is dropped from the sample.

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Bootstrapped standard errors

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Unemployment	Average	Median	Logged
	Rate	Wealth	Wealth	Wealth
L.Rate gap	0.526**	-19217.5	-7047.4**	0.0739
	(0.231)	(12543.7)	(3342.0)	(0.103)
Black men $ imes$ L.Rate gap	0.778***	9341.6	7380.5***	0.00531
	(0.123)	(9594.8)	(2698.8)	(0.0326)
Black women \times L.Rate gap	0.624***	23539.1**	6169.0**	0.0398
	(0.128)	(9317.7)	(2640.6)	(0.0659)
White women \times L.Rate gap	-0.0413	21363.0**	4851.9**	0.0539
	(0.0378)	(8519.6)	(2377.5)	(0.0354)
Time FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4699	672	672	672

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at the * 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1% levels. Regressions also control for current and lagged real GSP growth, the lagged value of the dependent variable, and group and state fixed effects. "Men" are "male- or dual-headed" and "women" are "female-headed HHs" in wealth regressions. Errors are clustered at the group-state level. Bootstrapping is clustered at the state level with 200 iterations. Aggregation threshold used is N = 1, where any state that has one or more race-gender-state-year observations below N is dropped from the sample.

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Results using wealth without home equity

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Average	Median	Logged
	Wealth	Wealth	Wealth
L.Rate gap	-25793.8**	-1277.8	-0.144
	(12693.5)	(2165.2)	(0.101)
Black men $ imes$ L.Rate gap	1833.9	827.0	-0.0670
	(15649.0)	(1287.7)	(0.0775)
Black women $ imes$ L.Rate gap	24390.1***	945.2	-0.168**
	(7411.5)	(1283.1)	(0.0805)
White women $ imes$ L.Rate gap	25824.3***	-573.6	0.0489
	(7551.9)	(1505.6)	(0.0354)
Time FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	532	532	532
Adjusted R-squared	0.395	0.613	0.506

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at the *10%, **5%, and ***1% levels. Regressions also control for current and lagged real GSP growth, the lagged value of the dependent variable, and group and state fixed effects. "Men" are "male- or dual-headed" and "women" are "female-headed HHs" in wealth regressions. Errors are clustered at the group-state level. Aggregation threshold used is N = 5, where any state that has one or more race-gender-state-year observations below N is dropped from the sample.



FFR/Wu-Xia shadow rates series, 1980 to 2019

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Unemployment	Average	Median	Logged
	Rate	Wealth	Wealth	Wealth
L.Rate gap	0.657***	-39745.0***	-10429.1***	-0.125*
	(0.114)	(12104.9)	(3438.6)	(0.0659)
Black men	5.616***	-235541.4***	-52526.2***	-1.087***
	(0.305)	(35954.3)	(10545.1)	(0.144)
Black women	3.638***	-262223.3***	-56419.7***	-1.510***
	(0.365)	(41192.4)	(10956.0)	(0.164)
White women	-0.808*	-160710.8***	-32144.5***	-0.448***
	(0.444)	(27807.3)	(9717.6)	(0.0685)
Black men $ imes$ L.Rate gap	0.555***	27221.2***	3959.7***	-0.00243
	(0.0800)	(4963.8)	(1388.2)	(0.0242)
Black women $ imes$ L.Rate gap	0.447***	30139.2***	2979.8**	0.0299
	(0.0810)	(5209.3)	(1248.6)	(0.0394)
White women \times L.Rate gap	-0.0241	18101.8***	1082.1	0.00295
	(0.0325)	(5260.2)	(1950.0)	(0.0165)
Time FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6560	988	988	988
Adjusted R-squared	0.473	0.601	▶ • 0.676	≣ ⊳ 0 <u>∎668</u> ∽ ∝ (
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FFR/Wu-Xia shadow rates series, 2008 to 2019

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Unemployment	Average	Median	Logged
	Rate	Wealth	Wealth	Wealth
L.Rate gap	-0.00816	-8455.8***	-2786.2	0.0122
	(0.0111)	(2633.7)	(1724.3)	(0.0317)
Black men	5.647***	-325287.1***	-80001.5***	-1.271***
	(0.375)	(73838.0)	(17160.5)	(0.234)
Black women	3.121***	-344737.6***	-83494.1***	-1.733***
	(0.340)	(79934.0)	(16980.1)	(0.272)
White women	-0.952**	-222855.4***	-55645.0***	-0.588***
	(0.430)	(46198.3)	(16731.2)	(0.118)
Black men $ imes$ L.Rate gap	0.000657	5498.4	1718.5*	-0.00523
	(0.00346)	(3467.1)	(985.6)	(0.0126)
Black women $ imes$ L.Rate gap	0.00469	6324.1*	1915.0*	0.0110
	(0.00641)	(3271.0)	(991.9)	(0.0138)
White women \times L.Rate gap	-0.000500	5505.6	1741.1*	0.0161*
	(0.00315)	(3890.7)	(952.6)	(0.00964)
Time FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1968	456	456	456
Adjusted R-squared	0.571	0.636 ∢ ∈	0.604	≣ , 0 <u>.</u> 603 ∽ ∝ (
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